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Abstract 
The emission trading scheme was devised to lower the cost of achieving greenhouse gas 
emission reductions: emissions are reduced where it is cheapest and emission 
certificates are then traded to meet the nominal targets for each participant. However, 
carbon markets, like other commodity markets, are volatile. They react to stochastic 
“disequilibrium” spot prices, which may be affected by inadequate policies, 
speculations and bubbles. The market-based emission trading, therefore, does not 
necessarily minimize abatement costs and achieve emission reduction goals. We 
introduce a basic stochastic trading model allowing to analyze the robustness of 
emission reduction policies under asymmetric information and other multiple 
anthropogenic and natural uncertainties. We illustrate functioning of the robust market 
with numerical results involving such countries as US, Australia, Canada, Japan, EU27, 
Russia, Ukraine. In particular, we analyze if the knowledge about uncertainties may 
affect portfolios of technological and trade policies or structure of the market and how 
uncertainty characteristics may affect market prices and change the market structure. 
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Uncertainty, Cost-effectiveness and Environmental 
Safety of Robust Carbon Trading: Integrade Approach 
Tatiana Ermolieva,Yuri Ermoliev, Matthias Jonas, Michael Obersteiner, 
Fabian Wagner and Wilfried Winiwarter 
 
1 Introduction 
The main goal of this report is to analyze robust cost-effective and environmentally safe 
carbon trading programs under asymmetric (private) information about cost functions 
and other natural and human-created uncertainties.  
Economic instruments for environmental regulations become popular both among 
policy-makers and scientific communities (Stavins 2010). Prominent examples of 
adopted economic instruments for the management of air pollution and CO2 reduction 
are emissions cap and trade programs (de Jong and Walet 2004; Kerr 2000). These 
programs are now a key element in climate change policy negotiations. Emission 
trading has established carbon prices as a new currency and emission permits as a new 
asset type (Kerr 2000).  
In theory, the emission price of tradable allowances (permits) should establish the 
marginal cost of emissions reductions to meet the cap. In reality, the prices exhibit 
periods of high volatility which may be a result of political decisions, information 
disclosure, speculations, bubbles, uncertainties around emissions and emissions 
reduction costs. For example, from January to April 2006, carbon prices went down 
from € 26/tCO2  to  € 10/tCO2  after the data for 2005 was verified and adjusted 
emission levels revealed (see Figure 1). Similarly, if not as abrupt, the recent crisis led 
to a dramatic decrease in carbon prices to about € 13/tCO2.    
As studied by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (Roos 2011), 
immaturity of the existing market policies triggered a major “dash for coal setting out 
on the construction of dozens of new coal plants. …”. Also, in the Netherlands, “… 
CO2 emissions trading is a marginal consideration in the choice of fuel. Evidently, 
electricity producers are not too bothered about the price they pay for carbon emissions. 
The vast majority still favors coal, the worst carbon polluter. The reason is simple: the 
expected costs of emission rights are negligible compared to other investment outlays.” 
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Building of coal-fired plants now, will lock-in further energy decisions for 
approximately forty years (Stikkelman et al. 2010). 
 
 
Figure 1. Source: www.pointcarbon.com (see also Betz 2006). 
The short-term information from market spot prices gained in different years/periods (as 
shown in Section 2) may contradict and cause parties to revise their “myopic” decisions 
which, however, may not be reversible.  
Lessons learned from the existing emission trading schemes point out to the need for 
market safety regulations smoothing its performance. In this report, we propose a 
computerized multiagent trading system (CMATS) which may function as a prototype 
of a real emission trading market without revealing the private information of parties 
about costs and emissions. The system may enhance/improve real markets by analyzing 
conditions for robust trades and stable market’s performance. In particular, it allows the 
introduction of emissions uncertainty for dealing with long-term decisions perspectives, 
potential irreversibility and “lock-in” equilibriums. CMATS is designed as a 
multicomputer network of traders and can be viewed as a device for decentralized 
collective regulation of trades by helping individual parties in understanding how they 
can implement trades at the lowest risk-adjusted costs.  
The report1 is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the classical approach to 
emission trading and discusses its shortcomings under uncertainty. This section also 
discusses main sources of emissions uncertainty. In Section 3 a model for robust 
emission trading under uncertainty and incomplete information is analyzed. Section 4 
                                                 
1
 The report has been substantially restructured and its revised version is forthcoming in Climatic Change 
journal.  
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outlines the structure of the CMATS and summarizes numerical results on trading 
involving such countries as US, Australia, Canada, Japan, EU27, Russia, Ukraine, etc. 
In this section we discuss how the knowledge about uncertainties may affect structure of 
the market, e.g., turn buyer into seller, and how new participants may improve or 
destabilize market’s performance. Conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
2 Emission trading under uncertainties 
A key issue for developing cost-effective and environmentally safe emission reduction 
schemes is the private character of information. If emission reduction costs are known, 
then the problem is reduced to the standard social cost minimization model subject to 
environmental safety targets. The asymmetric private information on emission reduction 
costs requires developments of special decentralized emission reduction processes 
which can be viewed as emission trading schemes. The report analyses this type of 
trading processes.  
Emission trading as an economic instrument for environmental regulations has been 
analyzed e.g. by Dales (1968). The author assumed that environmental agency requires 
each regulated source to submit a permit (also known as a quota, credit, or allowance) 
for each unit of pollution emitted. These permits are transferable. Each source reduces 
its emissions until it costs more for the source to reduce one more unit of emissions than 
to buy a permit. If the permit market is perfectly competitive, then marginal abatement 
costs will be equal to the permit price and therefore equal across all regulated sources.  
The equality of marginal abatement costs is a necessary condition for any given level of 
environmental quality to be achieved at the lowest overall cost, a condition known as 
cost-effectiveness. Putting a price on carbon was a crucial step towards market-based 
regulations of climate policies. Montgomery (1972) showed that market instruments 
may achieve their environmental objectives at lower information requirements than 
conventional command-and-control systems. Therefore, advocated by economists 
(Stavins 2010; Kerr 2000; Baumol and Oates 1975; Dales 1968), the idea of carbon 
trading markets becomes increasingly popular for global climate change control. The 
theoretical conclusion of the cost effectiveness is based upon assertion that emissions 
can be measured objectively and that noncompliance to environmental goals may be 
verified and penalized.   
Unfortunately, the existence of various exogenous and endogenous inherent 
uncertainties violates the performance of traditional deterministic pricing concepts and 
raises serious concerns regarding the ability of existing carbon trading markets to fulfill 
the main purpose of climate change control without creating world-wide irreversible 
socio-economic and environmental disruptions.   
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As Kyoto targets cover emissions from many individual sources, some where release 
processes are only partially understood, emission trading has been forced from the 
beginning to operate in uncertain environments. Emissions uncertainties vary in shape 
and duration depending on their origin (see de Jong and Walet 2004 and discussion in 
Ermolieva et al. 2010). In comparison to the main source of anthropogenic GHG 
emissions, CO2 from fuel combustion, other sources and GHG categories have much 
greater uncertainties and variability in measurement. Because of these, emission 
inventories or national systems may not be able to record the real extent or even 
direction of change in emission rates (Kerr 2000). A large variability of emissions may 
easily cause underreporting of emissions. Parties may also be inclined to underreport 
emissions in order to achieve compliance. Although emission trading is still only for 
CO2, countries participating in emission trading may bias their inventories in order to 
increase or redistribute the number of assigned amount units available for trading.  
Sources of emissions uncertainty have been classified into the following main 
categories (IPCC 1997): • Not included emission sources: There may be sources in many countries that have 
not yet been identified and escape inclusion in both the estimates and the list of 
sources excluded.  • Inadequate models of emissions estimates: Emissions estimates based on modeling 
of activity or processes which are believed to cause the emissions can produce 
large biased errors. • Changing definitions: Emissions inventories are meant to measure anthropogenic 
emissions. Although in most cases it is clear whether emissions from a particular 
source fall within this definition, there are a number of cases when the range of 
accepted definitions has changed over time.  • Errors in emissions factors and activity data involves two typical uncertainties: 
activity data, e.g., the quantity of fossil fuel burnt, cement produced or fertilizers 
applied; emission factors, i.e. the emissions associated with a unit of activity. The 
estimate of emissions includes two source is the product of the two factors.  
For all emission sources included in the Kyoto protocol, there are very different levels 
of uncertainties associated with the different data used to make calculations. Errors in 
emissions factors can have diverse causes, definitional errors, sampling errors, and 
measurement errors.  
A comprehensive discussion of uncertainties and their implications can be found in the 
volume by Lieberman et al (eds.) (2007) and in Gillenwater, Sussman and Cohen 2007. 
Winiwarter and Muik (2010) explored inclusion of emissions uncertainties for 
estimating total emissions in Austria 2005. Uncertainty characteristics for each 
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individual parameter were used in Monte Carlo simulations to treat non-normal 
distributions, dependencies between parameters, and extreme uncertainties. Figure 2 
shows probability density distribution of total emissions for Austria which is most 
strongly influenced by the lognormal distribution of the uncertainty in N2O (in CO2 
equivalent) emissions (as discussed in detail in the referred paper). This is a proof of the 
importance on assumptions taken for N2O emissions on the overall uncertainty of a 
national GHG inventory.  
 
Figure 2.  Probability density distribution of total emissions for Austria,   2005. 
(Source: Winiwarter and Muik 2010) 
Uncertainties from different sources can be analyzed under full greenhouse gas 
accounting (Lieberman et al., eds., 2007). Although data systems improve and the 
requirements for measuring emissions are being clarified, some source categories are 
inherently uncertain to be measured with accuracy. There will always be different levels 
and shapes of uncertainties in their estimates.  
Some characteristics of uncertainties can be derived after revisions of the historical 
emissions time series following “The Good Practice Guidance” report of the IPCC 
(IPCC 2000). Figures 3 and 4 show by how much estimates of emissions may differ 
between years, for Austria and EU27.  
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Figure 3.  EU-15’s CO2 emissions estimated initially and recalculated in 2005. 
(Source: Hamal 2010; NIR 1999-2007).  
 
 
Figure 4.  Austrian’s emissions estimated in 2000 and recalculated in 2001, 
2002, 2003 and 2005 (Hamal 2010; Austrian NIR 2002-2007). 
 
Figures 3 and 4 indicate that with time, the differences between the initial and the 
adjusted estimates become larger. 
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3 Stochastic model for robust emission trading 
Our integrated robust multiagent emission trading model seeks the goal that all the 
parties participating in emissions trading jointly achieve individual emission targets in a 
cost-efficient way under safety constraints by investing in emissions abatement, 
uncertainty reduction and by redistributing the emission permits through trading. A key 
complexity is associated with asymmetric information about cost function of parties. 
Emission trading affects and is being affected by emission uncertainties. In addition to 
asymmetric information, it implicitly contributes to reduction of other uncertainties for 
the two main reasons. First, trading is likely to lead towards more scrutinized emissions 
inventory compilation rules. Second, verifiability of trades requires that the reported 
emissions plus uncertainties are below the cap, therefore, trading creates incentives for 
parties to invest into uncertainty reduction prior to compliance. Our trading model 
exploits this phenomenon.  
Different uncertainties differently affect emission trading causing market crashes and 
instabilities similar to financial markets. To limit the role of uncertainties, advocates of 
regulated trades argue in favor of uncertainty constraints distinguishing sources by their 
uncertainty levels (Godal et al. 2003, Kerr 2004). Market regulators may set restrictions 
on source category to be included in trading. Trading scheme may demand a Party to set 
source-specific targets depending on the level of uncertainty. 
Following Ermolieva et al. (2010) we discuss a model which includes uncertainty and 
risk-adjusted regulations into emission trading schemes. The model explores conditions 
of market’s stability towards uncertainties by imposing appropriate safety constraints to 
control the level of admissible uncertainty which would guarantee cost efficiency of 
trades and safety levels of emission reduction targets (e.g., post-Kyoto pledge targets).  
These types of safety constraints are typical for pollution control, financial applications, 
stability regulations in the insurance industry and catastrophic risks management (see, 
e.g. discussion in Ermolieva et. al., 2005). In a sense, these constraints work as a 
probabilistic discounting mechanism which discounts the reported emissions to 
detectable levels overshooting uncertainty within a specified safety levels, i.e., portion 
of detectable emission changes.  
Since the concept of safety constraints discounts emission changes to detectable levels, 
this provides incentives to reduce uncertainty before trading. This significantly affects 
the trade equilibrium state. In contrast to “black-and-white” uncertainties characterized 
by symmetric intervals, the proposed stochastic model aims to reduce underestimating 
and overestimating costs by using additional information on likelihoods of uncertainties. 
Figure 2 illustrates these possibilities.   
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The general model is separated into two interdependent subproblems. As parties may 
not want to reveal information on their costs and uncertainties, they solve individual 
subproblems defining risk-adjusted cost functions which are used then by parties 
individually instead of myopic price-based evaluations.   
3.1 Party’s model 
Let us denote the least costs )( ii yf  for party i  to comply with imposed targets with 
given permits iy  and the target iK . Formally, this function is defined by equations (1)-
(2). Denote the variability of reported emission ix  as random variable ),( iii x ωξ , where 
iω  is a vector of all uncertainties (scenarios) affecting emissions of party i .  A random 
variable ),( iii x ωξ  depends, in general, on reported emissions ix . The uncertainty iξ  
can be reduced by investments in monitoring systems. Let us introduce for this purpose 
the variable iu  associated with monitoring and other technologies that may control the 
variability of emissions within the desirable safety level iQ . 
The individual optimization problem can be written now as minimization of function 
)( ii yf defined as the minimum of risk-adjusted expected emission reduction costs 
),( iii xc ω  and uncertainty reduction costs ),( iii ud ω  for a given permit iy  to be 
defined through dynamic trading process of Section 3.3: [ ]),(),(min)( ωω iiii
ux
ii udxcEyf
ii
+= , (1) 
under quantile-based environmental safety constraints  [ ] iiiiiii QyKxxP ≥+≤+ ),( ωξ , (2) 
for all parties i . Here iQ  denotes a safety level that ensures the probability that all 
potential emissions ix  and uncertainties ),( iii x ωξ  do not exceed emission target iK  
adjusted by permits iy . Safety level iQ  is imposed by regulatory agency to ensure 
robust performance of the market. Uncertainties of cost functions ic  and id  may be 
due to market performance, production shocks, and technological uncertainties, which 
are unknown in advance.  
 
Remark 1: (Probabilistic safety constraints). Safety constraints (2) are well known in 
financial applications as Value-at-Risk risk indicator. They are used for safety 
regulation of insurance companies, reliability of engineering structures, and catastrophic 
risk management (Ermolieva and Ermoliev, 2005). Due to  these constraints )( ii yf  and 
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)(yF  may not be convex functions. These constraints can be in a sense equivalently 
substituted by using convex risk functions based on Conditional Value-at-Risk 
(Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2000; Ermoliev and  von Winterfeldt, 2012) and using 
important convex stochastic approximations.  
 
Safety constraints (2) can be also written in the following form that in the case of 
analytically tractable distributions is reduced to deterministic nonlinear constraints (3). 
Let us define quantile )( ii xz  as the minimal z  such that  
 [ ] iiii QzxP ≥≤),( ωξ .  
Then the following equivalent constraints can be substituted for the safety constraint 
(2): 
     iiii yKux +≤+ , )( iii xzu ≤ . (3) 
These equations show that reported emissions must undershoot targets iK  adjusted by 
uncertainties of emissions iu  and permits iy . Equation (3) shows that safety constraints 
(3) induce risk-related upper bounds )(xzi  on uncertainty intervals dependent on 
reported emission level ix . Therefore, it allows to introduce risk-based undershooting of 
emission targets defined by “critical” quantile )( ii xz . 
Functions )( ii yf  define costs of permits iy  for parties ini ,...,1= . The main issue 
concerns cost-effective allocation of permits iy  under asymmetric information about 
cost functions )( ii yf , i.e. solution of the following problem.  
3.2 Social planner model  
The social planner (environmental agency) needs to find the permit vector 
),...,( 1 nyyy =  or distribution of permits among parties minimizing the total or social 
costs  
∑= =ni ii yfyF 1 )()(  (4) 
subject to  
∑ ==ni iy1 0  (5) 
This means that the total allocation of permits remains the same as at the initial state, 
i.e., ∑∑ == =+ ni ini ii KyK 11 )( . 
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Remark 2: (Market equilibrium): Assume that )( ii yf  is continuously differentiable 
and strongly convex function. Then, from the Lagrangian minimization ∑+∑ == ni ini ii yyf 11 )( λ , a trade equilibrium is defined as  the vector ),...,( 1 nyyy =
satisfying the following equations:  
λ−=′ )( ii yf ,   01 =∑ =ni iyλ . (6) 
 
From condition (6) it follows that the marginal value of a permit in equilibrium is equal 
to a λ  same for all parties. Unlike the standard optimization models, the optimality 
conditions (6) cannot be directly used because parties don’t reveal private information 
about functions if .  
3.3 Bilateral negotiations 
The model (4)–(5) is the standard optimization problem that could be easily solved by 
the social planner if private information on cost functions and uncertainties is available. 
The absence of information requires the development of specific decentralized 
optimization procedures which can be viewed as emission trading processes. Our 
procedures resemble bilateral negotiation process when any two parties exchange 
emission permits in a mutually beneficial way. Here we only briefly outline this 
procedure which in more detail is described for examples in (Ermolieva et al. 2010). Let 
),...,( 1 knkk yyy =  be the vector of emission permits after k   trades. Consider two parties 
i  and j  at step k  with permits kiy  and kjy . According to (6), if any two parties i  and 
j  have different marginal costs )()( kjjkii yfyf ′≠′ , then the permit vector 
),...,( 1 knkk yyy =  is not cost-effective. Assume that 0)()( <′−′ kjjkii yfyf . Constraint 
(5) requires that the feasible exchange in permits does not change the total allocation of 
permits, i.e. it has to be such that kjkikjki yyyy +=+ ++ 11 . If we take kkiki yy ∆+=+1  
and k
kjkj yy ∆−=+1 , 0>∆k , then the new feasible vector of permits 1+ky  for proper 
k∆  reduces the total costs of parties )()( kjjkii yfyf +  and hence the total cost )( kyF  
because: 
,0)())()((
)()()()()()( 111 <∆+′−′∆ =−−+=−
+++
k
kjjkiik
kjjkiikjjkiikk
oyfyf
yfyfyfyfyFyF
 (7) 
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for small k∆ . This equation demonstrates that bilateral trade reduces the aggregate 
costs for sources i  and j . From (7) for small k∆  we also have  
)()()()( 11 ++ −<− kjjkjjkiikii yfyfyfyf  (8) 
i.e., the new distribution of permits reduces costs of j  more than increasing the cost of 
i . Hence j  is able to compensate i  for the increased costs in a mutually beneficial way.  
Let us summarize the trade scheme more precisely. We assume that after picking up 
(say at random) a pair of parties i , j  these parties are able to find 1+kiy , 1+kjy  
minimizing  
)()( jjii yfyf +  (9) 
 
subject to constraints 
kjkiji yyyy +=+ , 0≥iy , 0≥jy . (10) 
In other words, for continuously differentiable functions )( ii yf , )( jj yf , a party j  
that decreases emission permit by 0>∆k  may negotiate with i  such a level k∆  that 
equalizes marginal costs, i.e., kk
k
ijk
k
ii yfyf λ=∆+′=∆−′ )()( , where kλ  can be 
viewed as an equilibrium price at step k . Let us note that price process kλ  is driven 
endogenously by cost-minimizing decisions of meeting parties, what is fundamentally 
different from standard models of financial markets with exogenously given price 
processes. 
After finding kλ , the procedure is repeated with another two parties, and so on. The 
sequential bilateral trades can go on as long as there are two parties with different 
marginal costs. The bilateral exchange of emissions at each step k  equalizes marginal 
costs which define an intermediate “local” equilibrium price kλ . During the process, 
marginal costs and prices will differ between the sequential trades, but finally the 
trading system converges to an equilibrium ),...,( **1* nyyy = , *λ  with marginal costs of 
all parties equal to equilibrium price as in (6). The proof of the convergence is for 
example in (Ermolieva et al. 2010). The following section shows that the bilateral 
trading procedure allows to achieve the so-called core solution providing parties no 
incentives to trade only within a smaller number of parties.  
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3.4 A core solution 
From (8) it follows that at each step k  trading parties ji,  can redistribute joint cost by 
using some variables 1+kiϕ  and 1+kjϕ  reducing initial costs of these parties in mutually 
beneficial manner: 
1111 )()( ++++ +=+ kjkikjjkii yfyf ϕϕ , )(1 kiiki yf<+ϕ , 
 
)(1 kjjkj yf<+ϕ . Therefore at the equilibrium ),...,( **1* nyyy =  parties will deal 
actually with payments )( 0* iii yf<ϕ  such that the following equation is satisfied: 
I
n
i
ii
n
i
i Fyf =∑=∑ == :)(1 *1 *ϕ ,  
where },...,1{ nI = . From this equation follows the Pareto efficiency of 
nii ,...,1
** )( == ϕϕ , i.e., a value *iϕ  cannot be decreased without increasing some other 
value *jϕ , ji ≠ , to satisfy this equation. An important question is whether the grand 
coalition I  of parties is stable, i.e., the following equation is also satisfied: 
∑ ≤∈Ci ci F*ϕ   
for any other coalition IC ⊆ .  Accordingly, a distribution of payments *ϕ  is a core 
solution if it satisfies these two equations. The bilateral trading procedure allows to find 
the equilibrium price *λ . Namely, if function )(yF  is convex, then it is evident that the 
payment distribution **** )( iiii yyf λϕ +=  is a core solution. In nonconvex cases, if the 
function )(yF  is globally Lipschitz continuous, then the core solution remains the same 
(see discussion in Evstigneev and Flam, 2001).  
3.5 Price-based scheme 
Let us compare the proposed bilateral trading scheme with a market price-based 
scheme. A cost-effective and environmentally safe price is a solution of the model 
which is dual to the basic primal model (4)–(5). The dual model derives the price λ  
maximizing the following concave and, possibly, non-differentiable function 
))((min)(
1∑ = += ni iiiy yyfg λλ  (10) 
A given market price signal λ  decentralizes the solution of internal minimization 
problem into individual subproblems of parties: find solutions )(λiy  minimizing 
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functions iii yyf λ+)(  for each i . In general, solutions )(λiy  don’t satisfy the balance 
equation (5), i.e. 0)(1 ≠∑ =ni iy λ , therefore the price λ  has to be adjusted towards the 
desirable balance.  
To ensure the balances, current kλ  at time ,...1,0=k  may be adjusted proportionally to 
the imbalance, i.e. )(' λg  for continuously differentiable )(λg :   
)(11 kni ikkk y λρλλ ∑+= =+  (11) 
with a small step-size kρ . From the convergence results of quasi-gradient methods (see, 
e.g., discussion in Ermoliev and Wets, 1988) it follows that with kconstk /=ρ , the 
sequence kλ  converges to the equilibrium price maximizing )(λg . Unfortunately, this 
type of procedures require the private information of parties for tracking imbalances ∑ =ni kiy1 )(λ  for adjusting prices kλ , ,...1,0=k . Uncertainties of markets, i.e. prices kλ
, make problematic achieving cost-effective and environmentally safe allocations of 
permits by using price-based markets. This requires rather sophisticated mechanisms for 
smoothing observable random prices of market process (11) consistently with step-size 
kρ . Yet, myopic price-based markets and auctions can be organized in a vast variety of 
ways. The main issue is whether proposed schemes truly address asymmetric 
information, uncertainties of emissions and costs, and cost-effective and 
environmentally safe solutions.  
4 Computerized Multi-Agent Trading System: 
Numerical Experiments 
The available computing technology allows us to organize a Decentralized COMATS 
based on model (1)–(5) and bilateral trading procedure of subsection 3.3. A distributed 
computers network connects computers of parties with the computer of a central 
agency. Using a graphical user interface, parties store private information on cost 
functions and other characteristics of the model defined by equations (1)–(5) including 
specific probability distributions and scenario generators characterizing uncertainties of 
emissions and other parameters.  
The central agency imposes market regulations in the form of safety constraints on 
environmental targets. Following the procedure in Section 3.3, the computer of the 
central agency “picks up” at random, a pair of parties i , j  and in anonymous manner, 
as it is discussed in Section 3.4, “negotiates” with computers of parties k∆  and vector 
 14 
ky  solving (9). Then, another pair of parties is picked up and the negotiations are 
repeated. These calculations can be easily organized without revealing private 
information of parties, in particular, due to distributed among different computers data 
of parties. The process goes on until equilibrium ),( ** yλ  is reached. The equilibrium 
solution can then be analyzed and implemented in reality using redistribution schemes 
discussed in Section 3.4. Therefore at the first stage COMATS evaluates equilibrium 
prices and permits, whereas at the second stage the equilibrium tradable permits *y  are 
implemented. The information about the equilibrium price *λ  identifies also the core 
solution (Section 3.4.) defining stable coalition of parties. It means that no party has the 
incentive to leave the coalition or terminate participation at any intermediate step. 
COMATS is of benefit both for parties and for the market. For parties, the prototype 
emission trading enables the analysis of the balance between robust cost-efficient and 
environmentally safe trades and emissions abatements. For the market, it allows to 
impose safety regulations ensuring stability and fair functioning without shocks.  
In what follows, we discuss the implications of uncertainties on market structure by 
using COMATS. To analyze the performance of COMATS numerically, we use 
relevant to (1)–(5) data on the costs of emissions reduction from the GAINS model 
(Amann, 2009; Wagner and Amann, 2009; Wagner et al., 2012) for the following 
countries and groups of countries Australia, Canada, EU27, Japan, Norway, Russia, 
Ukraine, USA. The marginal cost curves (of emissions reduction as a percent of pledge 
targets) are displayed in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5.  Marginal cost of emissions reduction as percent of pledge targets, €  per tC. 
Table 1 shows reported emissions levels in 1990 and 2009. Projected (baseline) 
country-specific emissions levels in 2020 are derived from the GAINS model, and the 
pledge emissions reduction targets in 2020 are set according to (Wagner and Amann 
2009). The data on emissions uncertainties and costs of reducing uncertainties are 
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compiled from IPCC, Nahorski et al., 2007, 2010; Obersteiner et al.,2000; Godal 
etal.,2003, Winiwarter and Rypdal, 2001; Winiwarter, 2007; Wagner and Amann, 2009; 
Wagner et al., 2012. We employ uncertain emissions level in the year 2020 as 
percentage of the reported business as usual emissions level in 2020. 
Table 1. Baseline and pledge targets (Source: Wagner and Amann 2009).  
  
Emissions 
1990 
Emissions 
2009 Baseline 2020 
Pledge target 
2020 
Unc. 
(% baseline) 
USA 5069 6006 6641 4815 15 
Australia 278 391 418 264 10 
Canada 456 558 693 433 15 
EU27 4399 4241 4677 4321 15 
Japan 1143 1270 1316 1086 15 
Russia 2499 1583 1945 2374 25 
Ukraine 716 339 374 680 25 
 
Table 2. Trades ignoring uncertainty. 
 USA Austr Can EU27 Japan Rus Ukr 
Em opt (MtC) 5017 397 643 4401 1274 1900 340 
Unc opt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Trades opt 202 133 210 80 188 -474 -340 
Marginal cost (€ per tC) 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Costs after trades 
(Million €)        
Em reduction  11091 261 650 2969 392 1270 200 
Unc reduction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Trades 2596 1637 2540 958 2231 -5739 -4046 
 
       
Total (core) 13687 1898 3190 3927 2622 -4469 -3845 
Costs for mitigation without 
trades 
(Million €) 
       
Em reduction 13839 16992 29341 4221 23959 0 0 
Unc reduction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
       
Total 13839 16992 29341 4221 23959 0 0 
Financial advantages 
of trading  152 15095 26152 294 21336 4469 3845 
Total profits       71342 
 
Table 2 illustrates the results of emission permit trades among seven countries ignoring 
uncertainties. In equilibrium, the cost of reducing reported emissions (also optimal price 
of emissions permit) is about €13 per tC, which is consistent with existing market trends 
(www.pointcarbon.com). Total costs of emissions reduction to targeted levels without 
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trades are defined by “Costs for mitigation without trades”, while “Costs after trades” 
stands for optimal costs for emissions abatements and trades. Financial advantages of 
trading are estimated by comparing the two alternatives. Optimal total (“core”) costs of 
parties are calculated according to formula (10). In these experiments, no emission 
uncertainties are included, therefore no costs are spent on uncertainties reduction, i.e. 
“unc. reduction” equals 0. Russia and Ukraine are major permits’ sellers (negative 
values of trades), and it is explained by their emissions levels in 2020, which are lower 
than pledge targets. 
 
Table 3. Trades with uncertainty. 
 USA Austr Can EU27 Japan Rus Ukr 
Em opt (MtC) 3519 385 606 4138 1229 1803 327 
Unc opt  249 37 59 988 150 331 153 
Trades opt  -1047 157 232 805 293 -240 -200 
Marginal cost 
(€ per tC) 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Costs after trades 
(Million €) 
       
Em reduction 38735 666 1733 9157 1259 3686 500 
Unc reduction 5031 344 626 2704 558 207 142 
Trades -25181 3782 5579 19360 6645 -5772 -4219 
 
       
Total (core) 18586 4792 7939 31221 8462 -2293 -3577 
Costs for mitigation 
without trades (Million €) 
       
Em reduction 21712 30087 59560 37598 90418 0 0 
Unc reduction 2925 4756 8204 8587 13354 71 0 
 
       
Total 24637 34843 67764 46185 103772 0 0 
Profits/financial 
advantages of trading 6051 30051 59825 14965 95310 2325 3577 
Total profits 
            212104 
 
The results of a scenario involving uncertainties are presented in Table 3. Optimal 
marginal cost of reducing unit reported emissions equals the cost of reducing unit 
uncertain emissions and is about € 25 per tC, which is almost twice higher than in the 
case when uncertainties are not included in calculations. The higher costs are due to 
more abatements as the uncertainties are now accounted for in the verification of targets 
compliance according to (2). Optimal marginal costs also increase because in this case 
Russia and Ukraine invest in uncertainties reduction and therefore can offer less traded 
permits at zero price than in the scenario without uncertainties. 
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Table 4. Trades with uncertainty, US excluded. 
 
USA 
(excluded) Austr Can EU27 Japan Rus Ukr 
Em opt 3519 336 518 3589 1165 1577 293 
Unc opt 249 35 58 989 154 295 149 
Trades opt -1047 107 142 257 233 -502 -237 
Marginal cost 25 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Costs after trades 
(Million €)        
Em reduction 38735 3860 8702 49011 6587 19884 3040 
Unc reduction 5031 1148 2003 8359 1680 690 356 
Trades -25181 7974 10665 19233 17556 -37469 -17901 
        
Total (core) 18586 12983 21370 76603 25823 -16895 -14505 
Costs for mitigation 
without trades (Million €)        
Em reduction 21712 30087 59560 37598 90418 71 0 
Unc reduction 2925 4756 8204 8587 13354 -38 0 
        
Total 24637 34843 67764 46185 103772 33 0 
Profits/financial 
advantages of trading 6051 21860 46394 -30417 77949 16928 16996 
Total profits       153270 
 
In the scenario when uncertainties are explicitly included in the trading, the US turns to 
a permit supplier. This is due to two reasons. First, the US marginal cost curve is a 
flatter slope than other countries. Second, because the assumed uncertainties in the US 
are relatively low. In this scenario, as Table 3 also shows, Russia and Ukraine invest in 
monitoring to reduce the uncertainties around targets and, therefore, supply less permits 
than in the case without uncertainties. Although the results have illustrative purpose, the 
conclusion is that the equilibrium price of emissions permits highly depend on 
uncertainties.  
In both scenarios, with and without uncertainties treatment, the “core” solution derived 
at equilibrium makes all parties better off. Total profits from trades equal about 71.3 and 
213 Billion €, in case without and with uncertainty, respectively, which is 19% and 23% 
higher, for without and with uncertainties, than in the situation without trading.  
Distortions to the emissions trading system may be caused by individual characteristics 
of market players. For example, as Table 4 indicates, participation of the US in EU ETS 
is of major benefit. The market without the US has much higher marginal cost (if 
compared to Table 3) due to rather steep cost curves and high demands in permits 
(except for Russian and Ukraine) of the other traders. 
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5 Concluding Remarks 
We discussed the gap existing between the theoretical conclusions about cost-efficiency 
of emission trading schemes and the reality. In theory, the emission price of tradable 
allowances should establish the marginal cost of emissions reductions to meet the cap. 
In reality, the existence of various exogenous and endogenous inherent uncertainties 
violates the performance of traditional deterministic pricing concepts. Recent market 
crashes raised serious concerns regarding the ability of existing carbon trading markets 
to fulfill the main purpose of the climate change control. Lessons learned from the 
existing emission trading schemes point out to the need for market’s safety regulations 
smoothing its performance.  
The proposed multi-agent approach integrating regulations of carbon emissions and 
uncertainties with redistribution of emissions through emission trading under safety 
constraints allows us to design a computerized multiagent trading system that may 
function as a prototype of a robust emission trading market. The model explores 
conditions of market’s stability with respect to uncertainty by using appropriate safety 
constraints controlling verifiable uncertainty reductions which would guarantee cost 
efficiency of trades and safety levels of emission reduction targets (e.g., post-Kyoto 
pledge targets). We illustrate functioning of the robust market with numerical results 
involving such countries as the US, Australia, Canada, Japan, EU27, Russia, Ukraine, 
etc. Explicit treatment of uncertainties may significantly affect portfolios of 
technological and trade policies, market prices and change the market structure. We 
conclude also that exclusion or inclusion of additional players may have dramatic 
effects on the market. 
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